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THE DREA^I OF MATERIALISM
BY WALTER B. LYDEXBERG
UT BELIEVE that we shall sooner or later arrive at a mechanical
X equivalent of consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechan-
ical equivalent of heat." In these words, Professor Huxley gave
utterance to what is perhaps the ultimate confession of materialism
with regard to its hopes and ambitions. Although Huxley died with-
out seeing his dream come true, and indeed probably without expect-
ing to, yet that he was justified in his expectation is not easily dis-
puted. His hope was based on a condition which exists—namely,
that there is a relation, possibly an indissoluble connection, between
a conscious, spiritual, immaterial, or imperceptible order of things
on the one hand and an unconscious, concrete, material or percept-
ible order of things on the other. Even as spiritual a one as the
Psalmist would not disdain to give due credit to the role of the mate-
rial in life, as he sang, "As for man, his days are as grass ; as a
flower of the field so he flourisheth. For the wind passeth over it,
and it is gone ; and the place thereof shall know it no more." This
is the materialistic view of things ; it is a view upon which the eyes
can not be closed ; it is entirely logical ; and there is no reason why
one should rebel at it. It is something forced upon us. It is the
expression of a truth. It is that which is seen—the perceptible. Nor
is it peculiarly a modern view ; it is perhaps as old as man. The
savage who staked his life on his trusty spear was, that far, a thor-
oughgoing materialist. The Hebrew who conceded vision to the eye
and intellect to the heart was, that far, a materialist. Coming down
to recent times we meet with the discovery of the intellectual func-
tion of the brain. As early as Shakespeare's time the role of the
brain in intellectual activity was common knowledge : how much
earlier than that is not so apparent, but it is clear that with the
Greeks and the Hebrews a man thought in his heart. We are not a
bit astonished to find late writers, as Cabanis, contending that the
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brain "secretes thought"; or as Voltaire, that "I am body, and I
think" ; or as Schopenhauer, that "if matter can fall to the ground,
then it can also think" ; or as Moleschott, that "without phosporous,
no thought." What did Kmerson mean when he said, "Man carries
the world in his head"? So certain was Ernst Haeckel of the legiti-
macy of this view that he did not hesitate to confide that "all phe-
nomena, from the most material to the most spiritual, can be ac-
counted for in terms of motion and matter."
lint the dirge of the Psalmist's had hardly subsided wdien he
touched his harp again and sang, this time another song, "But the
lovingkindness of Jehovah is from everlasting to everlasting upon
them that fear Him." How can that be? Man dies. Can that
eternal love be for mortal man ? No ; though man is mortal, there
is that which is immortal. Clearly the Psalmist was not satisfied
with his materialistic view of things. And how also about the sav-
age? It was not indeed alone on his trusty spear that he staked his
life, but in dance and song he invoked a power unseen, without which
his spear was but a broken twig. So, too, with the Hebrew,
although vision may rest within the eye, there is in man vastly more
than vision, for "the eyes of man are never satisfied." Although
Hamlet's mother was satisfied that the visions of her storm-tossed
son were but the "coinage" of his "brain," the son himself was not
so well satisfied with this materialistic view of things, as w^here his
mother found a brain, he found a conscience which "makes cowards
of us all." Though Voltaire was content to say of himself, "I am
body, and I think." he could not view the surpassing achievements
of Newton as the product of some surpassing body, but rather as
the product of "a mighty genius received from heaven." Schopen-
hauer, who reached the conclusion that matter can think, laid
infinitely greater stress on the reversal of the process in that it is
"will and idea" that is matter. And so, too, an examination of the
trains of thought of the most dogmatic materialists readily elicits
evidence that their stands are taken with hesitancy ; as Huxley also
concluded, "Legitimate materialism ... is neither more nor less
than a sort of shorthand idealism."
Here we find a confusion and contradiction which, on its face,
discountenances philosophy. Here is evidence of a conflict in the
reasoning of man starting with the dawn of history and still waging.
It is a battle not alone for the scientist and the philosopher and the
theologian, but a battle also for the man in every-day life, the bus-
iness man. the schoolboy, the housewife, the pleasure-seeker. In the
factory there are not simply buildings and machinery and finished
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product and bank-account ; there are anticipated recreation and free-
dom, recognition, honor, the approving smiles of loved ones." That
the schoolboy's pastimes and the wedding guest's love-dreams and
all the joys and sorrows and hopes and poetry and prayers of our
daily life are after all nothing else than matter in motion is what
materialism teaches. If it is so, let us not deceive ourselves. Let
us have the truth, and not be afraid of it. "The truth shall make
you free."
The essential doctrine of materialism is "All is material." Logi-
cally, this is impossible, as a whole can not be equal to a part. Clearly
all can not be material, as, for one thing, the immaterial can not be
material. To reach a stable footing the doctrine assumes the form
"there is no immaterial" ; and in this is involved a psychological dic-
tum that the immaterial is a mental illusion. The task of materialism
is to prove this psychological dictum.
In attempting this proof, materialism must by its hypothesis elimi-
nate as authentic data all but matter, inasmuch as in the hypothesis
there exists no such thing as the immaterial. Materialism has formu-
lated no definition of matter, and our only recourse in an effort to
obtain a definition of matter is an acceptance of the common under-
standing of what matter is, namely, that it is anything which is per-
ceived, seen, felt, apprehended—in other words, anything which we
may touch or see. The task of materialism is then to show how
matter (the perceptible) can produce the mental illusion of the
immaterial. Materialism has adopted no definition of illusion, and
our only recourse here also is the acceptance of the common under-
standing of what an illusion is, namely, that it is a supposed knowl-
edge of that which is not. The task of materialism thus narrows
itself to the construction of a psychology out of perceived things,
eliminating all psychology of imperceptible things ; the distinction
here is that between physiological psychology and empirical psychol-
ogy (the psychology of experience—thought, reason, imagination,
feeling, willing, as such). The data of physiological psychology are
accepted by materialism (the brain, nerves, etc.) ; the data of empiri-
cal psychology (the immaterial things thought, feeling, willing, etc.,
as such) are rejected. There are perceived brain, perceived nerves,
perceived organs of touch and sight ; and these, in their activity, are
all that knowledge and all the other data of empirical psychology are.
There is no such thing as mind, as such ; but instead there is the act-
ing brain. There is no such thing as intellect, as such ; no such thing
as knowing, as such ; nor as feeling, as such ; nor as willing, as such
;
nor as thinking, as such ; nor as hoping, as such ; nor as sorrowing, as
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such : nor as being joyful, as sucli : nor as devotion, as such ; nor as
having an illusion, as such (the illusion of the belief in the immate-
rial is simply that phase of brain activity which in empirical psy-
chology is called an "illusion"). This is the doctrine of materialism
narrowed to a point, although an accepted proof of this doctrine has
not yet been produced and the psychology of experience still as far
outweighs the psychology of the brain and nerves as the meal on the
table outweighs the dreams of the starving man.
The field of physiological psychology is a broad one, and it has
been well though not exhaustively explored. Possibly the task of
materialism is completed when it defines the data of empirical psy-
chology in terms of data of physiological psychology. Before this
task can be undertaken the general conclusions with regard to the
function of the brain must be clearly in mind.
Broadly speaking, the cerebrum may be described as an aggrega-
tion of nerve-cells in more or less intimate contact one with another
through the agency of structural elongations, nerve-fibers. The
number of these cells in the cerebrum has been estimated as 1,600,-
000,000 ; their average length in thousandths of an inch. It is not
known whether they are in immediate contact one with another.
With regard to the body as a whole, the cerebrum is that portion of
the nervous system midway between the terminals in the periphery
of the body (the end-organs of sense) and the terminals in the mus-
cular and glandular systems of the body. External conditions oper-
ating on the end-organs of sense are, through the medium of the
nervous system, known to be definite causes of muscular activity,
in the case of reflex action. The control of the muscular system is
definitely known to be centered in the brain, and the only observable
prime physiological function of the brain is the control of muscular
activity, an adjustment of the body to its environment ; or, as Pro-
fessor W'undt put it, "Everything that we call will and intelligence
resolves itself, as soon as it is traced back to its physiological ele-
ments, into nothing but sentient impressions transforming themselves
into movements." In other words, the only visible expression of
cerebral activity is resulting muscular movements ; that is to say, the
mental activity of a man is apparent only in his movements, his
speech, his writing, and other physical expressions.
It is not certain, however, that Professor Wundt was justified in
attributing the source of all cerebral activity to sentient impressions,
if by this is meant impressions arising in the end-organs of sense.
The evidence is clear that a single nerve cell, even one of the minut-
est and one wholly buried within the brain substance, may be affected
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by impressions developed within the cerebrum. The evidence is also
clear that all sentient impressions are not invariably transformed into
movements; rather the vast majority of sentient impressions appear
to be wholly absorbed and possibly entirely diffused within the cen-
tral nervous system. In other words, the function of the brain is
comparable to the function of a sponge. Furthermore, the possibil-
ity of strictly intercerebral stimuli must not be overlooked, such pos-
sibly as blood pressure and blood movement, chemical activities in
the structure of the cerebrum, latent cellular processes, and some
indefinite biological phenomenon which might be defined as the
stream of life ; definite knowledge of these factors is, however, lack-
ing. And there is the possibility also that cerebral nerve-cells may
be affected by forces reaching these cells not through the medium of
the end-organs of sense, but directly through the cortex of the cere-
brum, such as electrical forces, radio forces, or other telepathic
forces of kinds wholly unknown.
Whatever the source of cerebral activity, its visible expression, as
we have stated, is muscular movement or impulse to muscular move-
ment. The intensity of muscular movement is in a way susceptible
to measurement, as is possibly also, in a measure, the intensity of
impulse to muscular movement. The difficulty of determining a
minimum limit to the intensity of impulse to movement would seem
to be unbounded, so that the range of the intensity of impulse may
be from a maximum of a definitely measurable horse-power to a
minus infinity horse-power ; that is to say, there may be impulses
to movement so delicate as to defy all means of measurement.
It is to the action of this, physiologically speaking, absorbing
and controling organ, the cerebrum, that materialism turns for proof
of the illusory character of the knowledge of the immaterial.
It distinguishes between knowledge of the material and knowl-
edge of the immaterial ; the former is certain, the latter illusory ; the
former is gained through the end-organs of sense, the latter through
other sources.
What are these other sources? For the present they are hypo-
thetical. We have hinted that they may be intercerebral stimuli,
intercerebrally generated either by an ever-present "stream of life"
or by telepathic forces received directly through the cerebral cortex.
It is certain, however, that, from the essential uniformity of charac-
ter of nerve-structure within the external end-organs of sense (the
eye, the skin, the ear, etc.) and nerve-structure within the cerebrum,
it is possible that there may be one or more organs of sense wholly
within the cerebrum, necessarily and forever unknown to us through
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visual or tactual perception, receptive on the one hand of external
stimuli constantly being gathered in by the external end-organs of
sense, and receptive on the other hand, and simultaneously and
directly, of stimuli engendered in the nerve-matter of the function-
ing brain itself. In other words, physiologically there is no reason
why sensation should be limited to the external end-organs of sense
and not be a function also of intercerebral organs.
The presence of an intercerebral organ of sense, sensible only to
cerebral activity, might be considered as a physiological explanation
of the empirical phenomenon of self-consciousness. The nerve-
complex of the cerebrum may be considered to be under incessant
bombardment by stimuli from all sides, checking these stimuli,
absorbing them, and transforming them not into incessant mus-
cular activity, but into an incessant impulse to action. Simultaneous
with this incessant intercerebral impulse, new stimuli are constantly
being added to the fire by the external end-organs of sense. From
the blending of this complex of extra-cerebral and inter-cerebral
stimuli, a single momentarily predominating cerebral impulse must
result, expressing in some manner the fact of the conilict of an
external world with an internal world, the differentiation of these
two worlds, the differentiation of the self from the environment, the
differentiation of the self from the non-self, the phenomenon of
self-consciousness. In other words, self-consciousness may be de-
fined physiologically as the impulse to the adjustment of the body
to conditions imposed by the blending of simultaneous and conflict-
ing functionings of the end-organs of sense and an inter-cerebral
organ of sense—the simultaneous sensing of the self and the non-self.
It is conceded that self-consciousness is at the basis of the psychol-
ogy of experience, empirical psychology ; what sees, thinks, knows,
feels, wills is the self—nothing else. So in physiological psychology
it would become this sensed nervous system functioning, as distin-
guished from the sensed external world functioning, that is the self.
The empirical phenomena of knowing, thinking, perceiving, imagin-
ing, feeling, willing could therefore be defined as follows in terms
of physiological psychology. Knowing is a cerebrally contained im-
pulse to an adjustment either to an extra cerebral condition or an
inter-cerebral condition. Feeling is a cerebrally contained impulse
to an adjustment to a condition of the body as a whole. Willing
is a cerebrally contained, cerebrally originating impulse to an activity.
Thinking is a cerebrally contained imj^ulse to an adjustment to a
condition of receptivity of a continuance of cerebrally contained
adjustments to conditions. Perceiving is a cerebrally contained
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impulse to an adjustment to extra-corporeal conditions effective
upon the end-organs of sense. Imagining is a cerebrally contained
impulse to an adjustment to conditions not effective upon the end-
organs of sense. Remembering is a cerebrally contained adjustment
to a condition which does not exist but which did exist and which
has been cerebrally retained. The sensed functioning of any one
of these cerebrally contained impulses is the self-consciousness of
empirical psychology.
So we might go on, defining the phenomena of empirical psychol-
ogy in terms of cerebrally contained impulses to adjustments to con-
ditions, but the end-results would be as unsatisfactory as trying to
read an unfamiliar language. Tyndall declared that "the chasm
between these physical processes and the facts of consciousness re-
mains as intellectually impassable, as in prescientific ages." Not-
withstanding this, materialism must bridge the chasm. To this task
it is spurred on by the doctrine of evolution, in that the biological
and physiological data relative to the development of the human
nervous system appear to be not without meaning. Biologically and
physiologically considered, the simplest form of a functioning nerv-
ous system may perhaps be illustrated in the reflex action of the
simplest forms of animal life ; it may be denoted the inoutJi stage, in
which excitation of food touching the periphery of the animal is
followed immediately by the opening of the mouth to absorb the
food. A higher, and second, stage may perhaps be illustrated in the
reflex action of more complex forms of animal life ; it may be de-
noted the eye-mouth stage, in which only certain excitations from
light, such as a particular color, will result in the opening of the
mouth, thus developing a function of selection in the reception of
food. A third stage may perhaps be denoted the eye-foot-mouth
stage, in which certain kinds of vision react upon locomotive muscles
resulting in the propelling of the organism into conjunction with
food. A fourth stage may perhaps be denoted the stomach-eye-foot-
mouth stage, in which conditions within the organs of digestion con-
trol activity of the eye, foot, and mouth. Here, perhaps may be
imagined the presence of a central nervous system, coordinating and
controling after fixed laws the activities of the organism in conform-
ity with both internal and external conditions of a simple nature. A
fifth stage may perhaps be denoted the mate stage, in which phe-
nomena of so-called instinct enter, involving sexual selection, and a
higher development of the central nervous system. A sixth stage
may perhaps be denoted the offspring stage, a step still higher in the
play of instinct, in which the offspring is fed under controlled laws
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approaching in a measure intelligence. A seventh stage may per-
haps be denoted the fellowship stage, in which colony-instincts play
their part. An eighth stage appears to follow closely upon the fel-
lowship stage, which may be denoted the self-cotisciousness stage,
for it is clear that in fellowship selection of any complexity is in-
volved also the selection of that which is not a fellow, i. e., the self.
Little as we can know of the self-consciousness of the dog, we are
unable to understand how it can select and care for its maimed
brother except in so far as in some measure it is conscious of the
soundness of itself as distinguished from the maimed condition of
the brother. Here we must imagine the presence of a highly devel-
oped central nervous system, in which slumbers a latent impulse
ready at a moment's notice, upon the slightest provocation, to create
an adjustment of the body to conditions irrespective of digestive,
sexual, or maternal conditions—a love of fellows, playing an impor-
tant rule in the preservation of the species. A final, indefinite,
broadly inclusive stage may be imagined in a practically complete
control of all incoming and outgoing nerve-impressions by a central
nervous system ; a dominating cerebrum ; a storehouse of inhibited
nerve-impressions, latent but always potent ; an ability to retain and
repeat an impulse over a lifetime (memory) ; a state of cerebral
activity accompanied by long periods of muscular inactivity
(thought) ; an ability to sense and respond to inter-cerebral func-
tions (self-consciousness) ; the control of action on the basis of
received sounds vocally made (speech) ; the control of action on
the basis of received visions of pictures, signs, or w'ords tactually
made (writing).
This is the mind-machine of materialism's. It is nerve-force
functioning in nerve-matter and expressing itself in bodily impulses,
movements, signs, and sounds, largely through the agency of the
muscles. It is a force contemporaneous and coextensive with the
phenomenon life. Through it arises the illusion of the immaterial
;
and here we encounter the outstanding problem of materialism,
namely, to show, materialistically, how this illusion of the immaterial
arises.
With regard to this, the following deductions appear to fol-
low from the materialistic data presented. The mind-machine, like
all machines, is necessarily, with respect to the laws which govern
it, infallible. Nerve-force, like all forces, is essentially positive, not
negative. There can be no impulse to an adjustment, except it is
an impulse to an adjustment to a condition, as there can be no effect
except it is caused. Perception and its modifications, with respect
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to the laws which govern them, are necessarily infallible. Physio-
logically, there is no such thing as an illusion ; all is inevitable, neces-
sary, mechanical. Physiologically, every so-called illusion is, empiri-
cally considered, in itself an illusion, as physiologically there is no
illusion. The problem of the illusion is returned by physiological
psychology, to empirical psychology. Physiologically, every so-called
illusion is no more than a contradiction ; that is to say, conditions
may not be now as they were ; but it can not be said that, physio-
logically, conditions were not as they were. Contradiction, not illu-
sion, is physiologically possible,—an impulse to the adjustment to
a condition preceded by but still coexistent with an impulse to the
adjustment to an essentially contradictory condition. What I saw,
I saw; what I now see, I see. If I am impelled to adjust to the
condition of the house falling down over my head, it means that the
nerve-conditions attending the falling of the house were existent
;
if the house did not fall, I may adjust differently later. If I am
impelled to adjust to the condition of my body's being transported
toward the clouds, it means that the nerve-conditions attending such
a possibility are present. Whether the event occurred, whether it
was possible, are different matters ; the fact is, there was the physio-
logical nerve-adjustment,—a positive activity. My companion may
adjust or believe otherwise ; but, physiologically, what has his nerv-
ous system to do with mine? or mine with his? If I adjust to the
condition of life after death, what has that to do with past conditions
or with future conditions? How I may adjust in the future will
depend on me in the future. Thus imagination ; and if imagination,
belief ; and if belief, faith, are, like perception, like digestion, physi-
ological phenomena, effects of causes, phases of "matter in motion,"
factors in muscular control, materially inevitable, materially infal-
lible. My belief, my adjustment, is the predominant physiological
fact, the external world to the contrary notwithstanding. "As he
thinketh within himself, so is he," is as true physiologically as
empirically. In the psychology of the poet,
"Unfading Hope! when life's last embers burn,
When soul to soul, and dust to dust return
!
Heaven to thy charge resigns the awful hour!"
Has materialism any basis for sustaining a charge of fraud
against spiritualism? None that it can produce from materialistic
data.
On the other hand, has it grounds on which to support its
own proper claims irrespective of the contradictory claims of spirit-
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ualism? How far is it justified in its dogma? On that point, it is
evident that, physiologically considered, the extent of response of
nerve-force to external conditions is limited by its own nature. The
body can adjust nervously only to conditions to which nerve-force is
sensitive. Perception, the criterion of the material is therefore also
limited to perception. That far, it is an incomplete criterion, and
metaphysically an insufficient criterion. That which is perceived is
the perceptible, not the imperceptible. The cause, the origin, the
life-principle of this nerve-force—that which precedes it and condi-
tions it—being necessarily different from it, can certainly have no
part in it other than its cause. There is no more fundamental axiom
in materialism than that every effect has a cause. It may be true
that nerve-force is nothing else than the play of electrons and pro-
tons which constitutes also electrical force ; but if so, nerv^ous im-
pulses are limited to the range of this play, are dependent upon the
cause of it. and can not function except as such. You can no more
expect to find a nervous impulse existing under conditions other
than those of its own physical laws, than you can expect to produce
an electrical current with a single element of your storage battery.
Xor are ])hysiologically defined limits any less evident in the
empirical phenomenon of knowledge. Confucius is credited long
ago with having discovered that "there are things above the power
of human comprehension, beyond the grasp of human intelligence."
Similarly, we find that faithful historian of materialism, Lange,
reaching the conclusion that "the whole cause of materialism is for-
ever lost by the admission of the inexplicableness of all natural
occurrences."'
